( 7 reviews )
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Posted: Aug 4 2008
I'm still reading this book, but have jumped around a bit including reading of the conclusion. The style is similar to that of Lundstrom's two "First Team" books, which I also own. By similar, I mean that the book is generally readable, plausible, even-handed, and meticulously documented. The bibliography is very impressive. One of the most useful aspects of the book so far is its discussion of the various decisions in the context of the information available to the decision-makers at the time. What was and was not available is described in detail, with references. An interesting facet of the book is that it touches on and sometimes explictly discusses the "politics" of both the Navy and of naval history. I find these political dynamics to be quite similar to those seen in large present-day organizations (like my current employer).
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Posted: Nov 15 2007
This account of the World War II career of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher is a needed corrective to the misinformation that has been served up to the public over many years. Samuel Eliot Morison took a dislike to Fletcher, possibly because the admiral failed to cultivate him at the time he was writing his history of World War II. The inaccuracies, omissions, and critical tone toward Fletcher in his volumes have been reflected in the works of other authors. By writing the latest and possibly most detailed account of U.S. Naval operations in the Pacific from the start of the war through the Guadalcanal Campaign, Lundstrom has given us an updated history of this vital period when the Pacific War often hung in the balance. Many aspects of the naval war not directly involving Fletcher are discussed. Thus this book goes much further than merely providing a defense of Fletcher, it gives us the basis of a potential successor or even replacement for the histories of the U.S. Navy in the first year of World War II written by Morison and others. John Lundstrom is well qualified to perform this task by having written three major works on naval operations during December 1941 to late 1942. His previous work has clearly helped him make this book a success. He has done significant in-depth research of this period of the war by using original sources apparently not consulted by others. The result is a book which provides new details on many aspects of the Pacific War at sea. Minor negatives are a somewhat dry writing style and insufficiently detailed maps. "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" reminds us that it was Fletcher who commanded the U.S. forces at Coral Sea, the first battle to seriously slow the Japanese advance and which paved the way for the decisive victory of Midway. Fletcher, not Morison's hero Spruance, was the senior commander at Midway who made many of the critical decisions that resulted in the turn of the tide in the Pacific. Lundstrom explains why Fletcher's controversial withdrawal of the carriers from Guadalcanal was a wise decision. These carriers represented three quarters of the total U.S. aircraft carrier inventory and Fletcher was under orders not to risk them unless the potential results justified it. At Guadalcanal, the circumstances did not justify that risk. There has never been an official history of the U.S. Navy in World War II, only Morison's semi official history. While Morison's work is well written and valuable, it was produced too close to the events it describes so it contains errors and omissions. A replacement is overdue. With some revisions, "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" could serve as the first volume of a new multi volume history of the navy's role in World War II. John Lundstrom would be the man to do this job.
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( 1 of 1 found this review helpful ) Posted: Oct 14 2007
I've belatedly gotten around to reading the FJF bio, and it's absolutely indispensable to understanding the first year of the Pacific War. With due respect for The Big E, Fletcher and Yorktown (CV-5) lugged most of the flattop mail in the six months after Pearl Harbor, and with his Guadalcanal experience, he became the leading practitioner of carrier warfare in the US Navy--and in the world. If you don't read anything else, go to the Conclusion for an education in how history gets written, especially by Recognized Historians with agendas. As an example of expositive historiography it will stand alone for a long-long time.
