( 1 reviews )
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Posted: Mar 16 2009
This work is based on interrogations of German admirals and the essays they wrote in captivity immediately after World War II, presenting the opinions they offered by subject themes. Although the suthors have accomplished yeoman scholarship and present their material about as well as possible, the opinions themselves cast little light on the war or Germany's naval performance and are of relatively little use or importance. Frankly I expected much more -- thinking that the mixed group of officers would have many interesting viewpoints and could provide seminal thought on what was done right, wrong, and could have been done differently. Unfortunately the admirals fell back on sweeping statements and often allowed their personal feelings to compromise the information they offered. The best part of the book was the Introduction which explained the circumstances surrounding this little treasure trove of writings. The basic viewpoints of the admirals are discussed as well as the degree of cooperation by each. The subject themes which form separate chapters are; the prewar period, the first year or war, operation Sea Lion (invasion of Britain), ocean warfare against merchant shipping 1940-41, war in the Mediterranean 1940-41, operation Barbarossa, ocean warfare against merchant shipping 1942-43, the decision in the Mediterranean 1942-43, the Eastern Front 1942-43, ocean warfare against merchant shipping 1943-44, the invasion and the long retreat to Germany, fortress Germany, and conclusions and verdicts. As can be seen by this list of subjects there could be many interesting aspects to be brought forward, but the German admirals simply didn't do it. I gave this work three stars for effort and scholarship but was disappointed in the content. The admirals expounded with platitudes, obvious problems, and sought to place blame on others -- often Hitler and the Nazi leadership. The superficiality of the admirals was apparent and they didn't exhibit as much knowledge and insight as one could expect. Perhaps that was also a factor in their losing the naval war.
